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The human brain contains specialized circuits for ob-
serving and understanding actions [1–3]. Previous
studies have not distinguished whether this ‘‘mirror
system’’ uses specialized motor representations or
general processes of visual inference and knowledge
to understand observed actions [4]. We report the first
neuroimaging study to distinguish between these al-
ternatives. Purely motoric influences on perception
have been shown behaviorally [5], but their neural ba-
ses are unknown. We used fMRI to reveal the neural
bases of motor influences on action observation. We
controlled for visual and knowledge effects by study-
ing expert dancers. Some ballet moves are performed
by only one gender. However, male and female
dancers train together and have equal visual familiar-
ity with all moves. Male and female dancers viewed
videos of gender-specific male and female ballet
moves. We found greater premotor, parietal, and cere-
bellar activity when dancers viewed moves from their
own motor repertoire, compared to opposite-gender
moves that they frequently saw but did not perform.
Our results show that mirror circuits have a purelymo-
tor response over and above visual representations of
action. We understand actions not only by visual rec-
ognition, but also motorically. In addition, we confirm
*Correspondence: b.calvo@ucl.ac.uk (B.C.-M.), p.haggard@ucl.
ac.uk (P.H.)that the cerebellum is part of the action observation
network.
Results and Discussion
Observing someone else’s action allows us to under-
stand what the observed agent is doing. Two possible
brain mechanisms have been proposed to explain this
ability. On the one hand, the observer’s brain might con-
tain a specialized system for understanding actions,
based on representing the motor commands required
to make the action. On the other hand, the brain might
understand actions using the same general perceptual,
inferential, and theory-building processes that are
used to understand other objects and their interactions.
Studies of ‘‘mind-reading,’’ in which subjects explicitly
attribute beliefs to other people, make an analogous dis-
tinction between ‘‘simulation theory’’ and ‘‘theory the-
ory’’ [6, 7]. However, these two alternative theories
have rarely previously been distinguished for the funda-
mental case of understanding another person’s action
[8]. It remains unclear whether the brain understands
observed actions using a specialized system for motor
representation, or using general principles of inference
based on visual experience.
The human brain contains specialized parietal-pre-
motor circuits (‘‘mirror system’’) that are activated
when observing and understanding the actions of others
[1–3]. However, previous studies have not distinguished
whether these areas contain a truly motor representa-
tion, or simply general knowledge about the observed
action. We present a crucial experiment that distin-
guishes between these theories for the first time. We
show that observing an action evokes a purely motor
representation. This cannot be explained by general
processes of visual inference and knowledge.
We used a mixed factorial block-fMRI design to disso-
ciate motor responses during action observation from
those related to visual or theoretical knowledge associ-
ated with the action. Brain activity during observation of
intransitive actions was compared between two groups
of individuals who differ in motor skill but have similar vi-
sual experience of the observed actions. In classical bal-
let, some moves are gender specific (performed primar-
ily by males or females), while other moves are common
to both genders. However, all dancers are visually famil-
iar with both types of move, since male and female
dancers train and perform together over extensive pe-
riods of time. Therefore, all dancers have visual knowl-
edge of all moves, but they have additional motor repre-
sentations only for those specific to their own gender.
We compared activity when male and female dancers
viewed gender-specific moves performed by their own
gender, compared to other gender-specific moves per-
formed by the other gender. This enabled us to dissoci-
ate brain responses related to motor representation
from those related to visual knowledge about the ob-
served actions, allowing for a characterization of the
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observation.
Two groups of subjects, female and male professional
ballet dancers, viewed the same set of movement stim-
uli. Subjects in each group viewed video clips of a male
or female expert dancer performing gender-specific bal-
let moves (Figure 1; for examples, see Movies S1 and S2
in the Supplemental Data available with this article on-
line). In this 2 3 2 experimental design, the interaction
between subject gender and the gender of the observed
performer includes the effect of pure motor familiarity.
However, it also includes a confounding effect of gender
congruence: a subject watching a gender-specific move
for which he or she has the motor skill must be watching
someone of his or her own gender. To control for this
confound, we also included additional gender-common
stimuli, showing ballet moves routinely performed and
Figure 1. Dance Stimuli
Illustrative color 3 s videos of standard classical ballet moves that
are female specific (top) and male specific (bottom). Eight different
moves of each type were performed by professional female and
male dancers and matched by a professional choreographer for ki-
nematic features. The dancers’ faces were blurred (for examples,
see Movies S1 and S2 in the Supplemental Data).seen by both genders. The interaction between subject
gender and performer gender for the gender-common
moves gave an independent estimate of the confound-
ing gender congruence effect. That is, for gender-spe-
cific stimuli, each subject had motor expertise for the
moves performed by his or her own gender, but not for
those performed by the other gender. There was no cor-
responding difference in motor expertise for the gender-
common stimuli. The difference between the interaction
terms for these two classes of stimuli provides a pure
estimate of motor expertise effects.
Immediately after the scanning session, the subjects
completed a subjective questionnaire in which they
were asked how often they do and see the moves previ-
ously shown in the scanner. Subjects’ ratings of their vi-
sual and motor familiarity (see Figure 2 and Supplemen-
tal Data) confirm that subjects had equal visual
experience with the gender-specific and the gender-
common stimuli. In contrast, levels of motor experience
depended clearly on the gender of the subject in the
case of gender-specific actions, but not in the case of
gender-common actions.
Functional images of brain activity during action ob-
servation were analyzed by statistical parametric map-
ping (SPM2) using a general linear model applied at
each voxel across the whole brain. We fitted a factorial
model including factors of subject gender (male/female),
gender of the observed performer (male/female), and
type of observed action stimuli (gender-specific/gen-
der-common). The two-way interaction between subject
gender and performer gender includes an effect of mo-
tor expertise in the case of gender-specific stimuli,
plus a confounding effect of gender congruence. The
same interaction for gender-common stimuli contains
only the effect of gender congruence, since all subjects
commonly make and see all the gender-common
moves. Therefore, the difference between the two inter-
action terms, corresponding to the three-way interac-
tion of subject gender, performer gender, and stimulus
type, estimates the pure effect of motor expertise during
action observation. Areas showing a significant three-
way interaction included the left premotor cortex, the in-
traparietal cortex bilaterally, and the cerebellum bilater-
ally (Figure 3).Figure 2. Ratings of Visual and Motor Familiarity
Subjects rated their visual and motor familiarity with each movie in a postscanning questionnaire (scale: 0 = completely unfamiliar, 10 = highly
familiar) with the different classes of dance stimuli (female/male gender-specific moves and gender-common moves). For motor familiarity there
was a significant interaction between gender of observer and type of move [F(2,20) = 66.274; p < 0.001]. The corresponding interaction was not
significant for visual familiarity.
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Observation
Activations shown are the interaction be-
tween subject gender and performer gender
for gender-specific moves, minus the same
interaction for common moves. This differ-
ence between two-way interactions reveals
the additional activation associated when
the subject observes a move for which he or
she possesses the motor schemata, com-
pared to observing moves for which he or
she does not possess the motor schemata.
Subtracting the interaction for gender-com-
mon moves controls for the possible con-
founding effect of observing someone of the
same gender as oneself. Projections of the
activation foci on the surface of a standard brain (Montreal Neurological Institute [MNI]) at p < 0.001. Note that this projection renders onto
the surface activity, which may in fact be located in the sulci. Arrows indicate activity in areas described as part of the mirror system: (1) left dorsal
premotor cortex, (2a) left intraparietal sulcus, and (2b) right intraparietal sulcus.To visualize how motor expertise influenced the acti-
vation of these areas, we separately calculated parame-
ter estimates for the 23 2 interaction of subject and per-
former gender. This calculation was done for the
gender-specific moves and for the gender-common
moves. Subtracting the latter from the former gives a
2 3 2 set of parameter estimate differences related to
motor expertise (Figure 4). These showed that experts
had greater activation when observing the specific
movements that they could perform than when observ-
ing movements that they were not used to performing.
This produced a crossover interaction between subject
gender and performer gender, even after subtracting
any possible gender congruence effects, to obtain pa-
rameter estimate differences (Figure 4). Thus, while all
groups saw the same stimuli, the mirror system areas
of their brains responded to the stimuli in a way that de-
pended on the observer’s specific motor expertise. The
parameter estimates show that motor expertise influ-
enced brain activity of both male and female subjects
in a similar way, though the influence was stronger for
males than for females. These results show that observ-
ing an action can activate the corresponding motor rep-
resentation. For example, the brain could perform an
internal simulation of the specific motor program for
the observed movement.
In addition, further activations (see Table S2) were
found in the precuneus, the parahippocampal region bi-
laterally, and the left hippocampus. Similar activations
were found and discussed in previous studies [9]: we
therefore focus here on the activations in motor-related
areas.
We show that the brain’s response to seeing an action
depends not only on previous visual knowledge and ex-
perience of seeing the action, but also on previousmotor
experience of performing the action. The observation of
action involves matching to the individual’s motor reper-
toire, and not only to a perceptual template. Our results
strongly support the concept of motor simulation in the
human mirror system. When we observe someone else’s
actions, several distinct mental representations may be
involved. First, there may be purely visual representa-
tions of stimulus kinematics [10–12], of the agent’s
body [13, 14], and of any object that may be associated
with the action [15]. A strong mirror hypothesis posits
that viewing actions automatically evokes a further,purely motoric representation of the motor commands
for the observed action. Previous neuroimaging studies
have not disentangled which of these representations is
contained in the human mirror system. Human neuroi-
maging studies have used a wider range of observed ac-
tions, including simple actions such as grasping [16, 17],
movement of different body parts [18], identical actions
performed by different body parts [19], and meaningless
symbolic actions [20, 21]). However, in each case, mirror
system activation in these studies could be interpreted
as a nonspecific visual response rather than a specifi-
cally motoric response.
The present study avoids these visual confounds. The
dance movements studied here did not involve external
objects. However, we found clear mirror system activa-
tion despite absence of object representation. This re-
sult agrees with previous studies showing parietal, pre-
motor, and cerebellar activations during observation of
meaningless, intransitive actions [20, 22].
We used expertise effects to separate the visual
knowledge from motoric representations involved in ac-
tion observation. When an individual learns a new skill,
he or she acquires new perceptual and motor represen-
tations [23]. Expertise effects compare brain activity be-
tween individuals who have acquired such representa-
tions, and those who have not. Previous studies have
aimed to use acquired motor skills [9, 24, 25] to investi-
gate whether mirror areas contain a purely motoric rep-
resentation of observed actions. These studies showed
greater mirror activity when watching a movement
whose motor representation had been acquired com-
pared to watching those that had not. However, none
of these studies dissociates the observer’s motor skill
level from his or her visual familiarity with the action
stimulus observed. Thus, skill sensitivity in the mirror
system could reflect either differences in the ability to
simulate the observed action motorically or differences
in visual familiarity with the stimulus. To qualify as a dis-
tinct functional neural system, mirror systems should
perform motor simulation, and not mere visual recogni-
tion. Several neurophysiological studies, including re-
cordings of single mirror neurons in the primate, are am-
biguous on this point. One recent study reported a class
of mirror neurons that develops a purely visual response
to observed actions involving tools that the monkey it-
self does not use [4]. However, perceptual and motor
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1908Figure 4. Sagittal and Coronal Sections and Parameter Estimates Showing Influence of Pure Motor Expertise in Action Observation
The effect of pure motor expertise was estimated using the difference between parameter estimates for the 2 3 2 interaction between subject
gender and performer gender for gender-specific moves, and for the corresponding 2 3 2 interaction when viewing gender-common moves.
Subtracting the interaction for gender-common moves controls for the confounding effect of observing someone of the same gender as oneself.
Areas showing an effect of pure motor expertise (p < 0.001) include (A) left dorsal premotor cortex [248 6 45], (B) left inferior parietal sulcus
[242 257 48], and (C) right cerebellum [45 260 251]. Black bars show results for male observers, and white bars show results for female ob-
servers. The motor expertise effect is present for both male and female dancers but is stronger for males. This difference was not predicted
and does not detract from the predicted relation between neural activity and motor expertise.processes have been dissociated in a recent behavioral
study [5]. There, learning a motor skill while blindfolded
led to improved visualdiscrimination that was specific to
the acquired motor pattern. Our design involved holding
visual familiarity constant, while comparing individuals
who differed in motor expertise. In our study, expertise
refers to a very specific set of overlearned, stereotyped
actions, rather than general differences in motor ability
or motor differences between individuals or between
species [26]. The motor representations evoked when
our subjects viewed actions that they could perform
could therefore be specific motor commands for each
precisely characterized action sequence.
After controlling for the effect of visual familiarity with
the observed actions, we found clear evidence for
a purely motoric activation in three areas of the brain’s
motor network: premotor, parietal, and cerebellar corti-
ces. The premotor and parietal activations agreedclosely with results of previous studies [18, 27, 28].
The premotor activation was strongest in the left hemi-
sphere [16, 29], while the parietal activations were more
bilateral [9]. Cerebellar activation has also been reported
in fMRI studies of action observation [20, 30–32]. How-
ever, it is rarely discussed, and to our knowledge, no pri-
mate studies have recorded from the cerebellum during
action observation. Petrosini et al. [33] studied the ability
of rats to learn new patterns of movement in a water
maze by mere observation of another animal swimming
in the maze. They found that cerebellar lesions impair
this ability. We found bilateral cerebellum activations
that resulted from motor simulation, suggesting a more
extended action observation network than previously
suggested by classical primate studies [2, 3].
We found no effects of motor expertise in temporal
lobe areas concerned with visual expertise [34], support-
ing the idea that our experimental design adequately
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in areas concerned with categorization and naming [35],
suggesting that all subjects had equivalent semantic
knowledge of all actions, despite differences in motor
repertoire. Finally, we found no effects in the superior
temporal sulcus (STS). This area was activated in biolog-
ical motion [10–12] and some action observation studies
[9, 24, 36]. The present study suggests that, when visual
and motoric representations are clearly distinguished,
the human STS represents visual rather than motoric as-
pects of actions.
Although the subjects in our experiment viewed ac-
tions of an individual dancing alone, their professional
work requires an exquisite ability to observe the actions
of others. This observation has a clear motoric aim, for
example, in perfecting the dancer’s own repertoire by
watching a teacher, or in synchronizing with others in
pas de deux or corps de ballet pieces. Motor simulation
would clearly facilitate these aspects of dance skill.
To summarize, the present study clearly separates vi-
sual from motor components of action observation in
the human brain for the first time. The visual aspect of
viewing the human body is held constant, since all sub-
jects saw the same stimuli. Although body perception
processes may also depend on the bodily similarity be-
tween observer and observed, we controlled for any
such effects by subtracting parameter estimates for
gender-common actions from those for gender-specific
actions danced by the same performers. Our results
therefore show that mirror system activity depends on
possessing the motor representation for an observed
action, and not only on the visual knowledge of what is
observed. This finding strongly supports the hypothesis
that the motor-related areas of the brain simulate the
commands for observed actions. These areas include
the parietal, premotor, and cerebellar cortices. Individ-
ual differences in motor expertise provide a valuable
means of separating visual aspects of action observa-
tion from truly motor representations.
Experimental Procedures
Subjects
Twenty-four professional ballet dancers from the London Royal Bal-
let (12 females, 12 males) participated in the study. All subjects were
right handed with normal vision, had no past neurological or psychi-
atric history, and were aged 18–32. All gave written informed con-
sent and were paid for their participation. The protocol was ap-
proved by the Ethics Committee of the Institute of Neurology,
London.
Stimuli and fMRI Task
Color videos of standard classical ballet were recorded using a dig-
ital camera. The movements were performed by a male and by a fe-
male professional ballet dancer. The dancers were naive as to the
purpose of the study. They wore similar garments and performed
in front of the same background. Gender-specific female, male,
and gender-common ballet moves were matched with the help of
a professional choreographer according to criteria of speed, part
of the body employed, body location in space, and direction of
body movement. The choreographer selected those moves that
achieved the best possible kinematic match between the different
movement classes. Eight 3 s clips of each class of movement
were selected and digitally edited. The dancers’ faces were blurred
to ensure that subjects processed body kinematics, rather than indi-
vidual or emotional features (see Figure 1 and the Supplemental
Data for examples). The videos were presented on a screen situatedoutside the scanner, which the subject viewed via a mirror (20 3 12
cm) located inside the scanner. During the experiment, each video
was repeated four times. Still images were used as a baseline
condition.
Stimuli were presented in a block design. Subjects were in-
structed to indicate ‘‘how symmetric’’ they thought each video
was by pressing one of three keys with three fingers of the right
hand. This subjective judgment could be performed equally well
on moving and static stimuli, and for all degrees of familiarity. To
avoid motor preparation, assignment of buttons to response cate-
gories was randomized across trials. Previous training with this re-
sponse schedule was performed outside the scanner with a second
set of dance movies. Once the scanner session was finished, sub-
jects completed a questionnaire to indicate their visual familiarity
(question: ‘‘How often do you see this move?’’) or motor familiarity
(question: ‘‘How often do you do this move?’’). The questionnaire re-
ferred to each move shown in the experiment by its well-established
name in classical ballet terminology. Subjects responded using
a Likert scale between 0 (never) and 10 (very often). Questionnaire
data were not available for one male dancer.
Scanning and Data Analysis
The fMRI data were acquired on a 1.5T Magnetom VISION system
(Siemens). Functional images were obtained with a gradient echo-
planar sequence using blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD)
contrast, each comprising a full brain volume of 36 contiguous axial
slices (2.5 mm thickness). Volumes were acquired continuously with
a repetition time (TR) of 3.15 s. A total of 480 scans were acquired for
each participant in a single session (20 min), with the first five vol-
umes subsequently discarded to allow for T1 equilibration effects.
During fMRI scanning, eye position was monitored online by an in-
frared eye tracker.
The data were analyzed using a general linear model in SPM2
(Welcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience; http:www.fil.ion.
ucl.ac.uk/spm/) implemented in MATLAB 6.5 Release 13. Individual
scans were realigned, slice time corrected, normalized, and spatially
smoothed by a 6 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel using standard SPM
methods. The voxel dimensions of each reconstructed scan were
33 33 3 mm. Population inference was made through a two-stage
procedure. At the first level we specified in a subject-specific analy-
sis where the BOLD response was modeled by a boxcar waveform
of 22 s representing a single block, convolved with a canonical he-
modynamic response function plus temporal and dispersion deriva-
tives. Statistical parametric maps of the t statistic were generated
for each subject, and the contrast images were stored.
In a second level random effects analysis, we used a 2 3 2 3 3
(subjects [male, female], actors [male, female], stimuli [gender
moves, common moves, static image]) ANOVA model. We con-
structed a t contrast to test for a three-way interaction to find areas
showing increased activity with motor familiarity. We defined motor
familiarity as the interaction of interest (subject gender 3 gender of
observed actor for gender-specific moves) minus the interaction
(subject gender 3 gender of observed actor for gender common
moves). This subtraction controls for the confounding effect of see-
ing someone of the same gender. Plots of parameter estimates were
used to characterize whether the pattern of interaction reflects an ef-
fect of motor expertise. The surviving activated voxels were super-
imposed on high-resolution structural magnetic resonance (MR)
scans of a standard brain (Montreal Neurological Institute, MNI).
Anatomical identification was performed with reference to the atlas
of Duvernoy [37].
Supplemental Data
The Supplemental Data include two tables and two examples of the
videos used as stimuli in the experiment and can be found with this
article online at http://www.current-biology.com/cgi/content/full/
16/19/1905/DC1/.
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